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COMMENT
THE OPIOID CRISIS IN INDIAN COUNTRY: THE IMPACT
OF TRIBAL JURISDICTION AND THE ROLE OF THE
EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE
Matt Irby*
Opioids have been a significant part of pain treatment in the United
States for over 150 years.1 Stories of overdose from the early nineteenth
century are almost indistinguishable from stories today. 2 For example, Ella
Henderson was a thirty-three-year-old hotel owner in high society Seattle,
Washington. 3 Following the death of her beloved father, Ms. Henderson
sought the help of doctors, who were ready and willing to prescribe to her a
cutting-edge new treatment for both physical and emotional pain:
morphine. 4 Liberal prescription was the practice of the time, and like many
others, Ms. Henderson was soon overwhelmed by addiction. 5 Referred to in
the local newspaper as a “Beautiful Opium Eater,”6 her community shunned
her, and she died alone in her room; the year was 1877.7
By the turn of the twentieth century, Congress began to respond to an
epidemic indistinguishable from the one the United States faces today
through enactment of the Pure Food and Drug Act of 1906.8 Congress also
passed the Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act of 19149 and the Anti-Heroin Act of

* Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. See Clinton Lawson, America’s 150-Year Opioid Epidemic, N.Y. TIMES, May 19,
2018, at 10.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768, 768 (“For preventing the manufacture, sale, or transportation
of adulterated or misbranded or poisonous or deleterious foods, drugs, medicines, and
liquors, and for regulating traffic therein, and for other purposes.”).
9. Ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785, 785 (“To provide for the registration of, with collectors of
internal revenue, and to impose a special tax upon all persons who produce, import,
manufacture, compound, deal in, dispense, sell, distribute, or give away opium or coca
leaves, their salts, derivatives, or preparations, and for other purposes.”).

353

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019

354

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

192410 in the wake of the twentieth century opioid epidemic. These
congressional acts worked to prevent the flow of illicit opiates in the United
States but failed to control the origin of addiction that led to their use—the
medical community’s over-prescription of these problematic narcotics.11
On the heels of the Roaring Twenties and the Great Depression,
America’s focus soon turned to war, pushing the danger of opioids out of
the public eye. As veterans returned from World War II battlefields,
families began to grow. Although the 1950s is often characterized by
conformity and conservatism, abuse and misuse of opiates lurked in the
background until the 1970s, when Congress again responded. 12 This time,
Congress attempted to control first the source of legal opiates—doctors and
pharmacies—and second, the illicit sources of opiates on the black
market. 13 Over the course of the next two decades, doctors were instructed
to give opioids sparingly for chronic pain unless the patient was at death’s
door.14 Doctors and nurses were so concerned “drug addiction itself [would]
become a hideous spectacle” that they often under-used opioids, even
below the suggested dosage based on the circumstances.15
As the cloud that followed opiates through the 1970s began to lift by the
mid-1980s, cancer specialists challenged the notion that long-term opiate
use would “lead the unwitting patient down the primrose path to
addiction.”16 One doctor in particular, Dr. Kathleen Foley, then of the
Memorial-Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center in New York City, was especially
influential in the resurgence of pain management through long-term opiate
use. 17 Dr. Foley published two studies in the early 1980s that showed
addiction to be “rare among inpatients.” 18 Dr. Foley’s justification for
opioid use was that there were no long-term studies showing that pain
patients were likely to become addicted. 19 The reality of the claim,

10. Ch. 352, 43 Stat. 657, 657 (“Prohibiting the importation of crude opium for the
purpose of manufacturing heroin.”).
11. See Lawson, supra note 1.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Marcia L. Meldrum, The Ongoing Opioid Prescription Epidemic, 106 AJPH 1365,
1365 (2016).
15. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
16. Id. (internal quotation omitted).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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however, was that no long-term studies existed to demonstrate how patients
would respond. 20
Doctors celebrated Dr. Foley’s work and felt emboldened to introduce
opiates as a part of chronic pain treatment. Patients felt empowered by
doctors trusting them to take part in their own pain management. 21 During
the 1990s, prescriptions for opioids began to rise across the country, and the
pharmaceutical industry spread the word about opioids, sponsoring
presentations by physicians “championing chronic opioid therapy.” 22 It was
during this time period that prescription opioid overdose deaths again
started to rise.23
In the early 2000s, pharmaceutical manufacturer Purdue launched a
nationwide advertisement campaign promoting its newest opioid product,
OxyContin.24 That ad campaign included language billing OxyContin as
non-addictive because of its slow release in the body. 25 One ad stated, “in
fact, the rate of addiction amongst pain-patients who are treated by doctors
is much less than one percent . . . . These drugs, which I repeat are our best,
strongest pain medications, should be used much more than they are for
patients in pain.”26 Legitimate doctors and “pill-mill” operators alike
prescribed OxyContin widely for all types of ailments. 27 OxyContin became
popular on the black market because low-income patients were willing to
sell from the almost unlimited prescriptions they received, and the pills
themselves were easily crushed into powder to enable the desired high for
the end user.28 Feeling the pinch of high OxyContin prices, recreational
users soon found a cheaper alternative in black tar heroin. 29 Heroin
traffickers took notice of the high use of OxyContin and other prescription
opioids in middle America and capitalized on the opportunity. 30 The

20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Understanding the Epidemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html (last updated Dec. 19, 2018).
24. Meldrum, supra note 14, at 1366.
25. Id.
26. Our Amazing World, Purdue Pharma OxyContin Commercial, YOUTUBE (Sept. 22,
2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Er78Dj5hyeI.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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increase in heroin use led to a sharp 137 percent increase in overdose deaths
between 2000 and 2014.31
This brings us to the present day, which is known as the “third wave” of
the opioid crisis. The third wave is characterized by the rise of synthetic
opioids, primarily illicitly manufactured fentanyl (IMF).32 Heroin, IMF, and
prescription opioid misuse and abuse are decimating communities across
the country. In 2016 and 2017 alone, 11.4 million people misused opioids,
2.1 million people suffered non-fatal opioid overdose, 2 million people
misused for the first time, and 42,000 people died from an opioid
overdose. 33 During the same time frame, 886,000 people used heroin,
81,000 of which used for the first time. As a result, 15,469 people died of a
heroin overdose, and 19,413 people died of an IMF or other synthetic
opioid overdose.34
The Native American community has experienced particularly
devastating impacts from the opioid crisis. Part I of this Comment will
discuss the impact of the crisis on Native communities and how the federal
government’s response has failed Native peoples. In response to that
failure, the Cherokee Nation filed the first legal action in tribal court in an
attempt to protect its citizens and hold the pharmaceutical industry
responsible for the catastrophic impact on the Tribe.
Part II will lay out the procedural posture and the dismissal of the
Nation’s suit by way of a tribal jurisdiction decision in federal district court.
Part II will then analyze the court’s opinion and ultimate decision to rule in
favor of the opioid defendants by relying on the jurisdiction test laid out in
Montana v. United States.35 Part II will argue that the district court erred in
its ruling for the pharmaceutical defendants when it enjoined the Cherokee
Nation from civil litigation in its tribal court. By reviewing case law citing
to Montana and the exhaustion doctrine, Part II will show that the district
court should have applied the exhaustion doctrine in the case. This Part will
argue that the district court was not precluded from applying the exhaustion
doctrine but rather that current Supreme Court precedent welcomes its use
to further the recognition of tribal sovereignty.
Part III will discuss the procedural posture of the most recent
development in the Cherokee Nation’s opioid litigation. In a multi-district
31. Id.
32. Understanding the Epidemic, supra note 23.
33. What Is the U.S. Opioid Epidemic?, HHS.GOV/OPIOIDS, https://www.hhs.gov/
opioids/about-the-epidemic/index.html (last reviewed Jan. 22, 2019).
34. Id.
35. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
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litigation suit in Federal District Court for the Northern District of Ohio,
Eastern Division, the Tribe’s claims were summarily dismissed from
Oklahoma state district court based on the federal officer removal statute.
Part III will discuss how this decision fell short of the statute’s standard,
and that the court should have allowed the Tribe to participate in the State
of Oklahoma’s litigation against the opioid defendants.
The rulings discussed in Part II and Part IIIhave forced the Cherokee
Nation into litigating in federal court in an unfamiliar venue or dropping the
suit altogether. While the Cherokee Nation is stuck in a holding pattern, the
first trial against opioid defendants was held in Cleveland County,
Oklahoma.36 After a bench trial, the judge found Johnson and Johnson
liable for damages in a nuisance action. 37 The judge awarded the state $527
million in abatement funds.38
I. Background
Rory Wheeler is a member of the Seneca Nation of Indians in New York
and an emergency medical technician for the Tribe. 39 Wheeler, at only
nineteen years old, has already seen the serious impact the opioid epidemic
is having on Indian Country.40 In October of 2016, Wheeler responded to
two separate calls for “female possible overdose” in one day. 41 Both of
these young women were members of the Seneca Tribe, both were mothers
to young children, and both died on the scene. 42 Wheeler said this was the
day that “changed [his] life,” and he “began to realize that the issue of
opiates was serious in [his] community and that [he] had to do
something.”43
The crisis has hit communities across the country hard, and Indian
Country has not been immune from its impact. Poverty and poor health
make Native American communities acutely vulnerable to the opioid

36. Oklahoma v. Johnson & Johnson, No. CJ-2017-816 (Cleveland Cty. Dist, Ct., Aug.
26, 2019).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Suzette Brewer, Tribes Lead the Battle to Combat a National Opioid Crisis, HIGH
COUNTRY NEWS (May 9, 2018), https://www.hcn.org/articles/tribal-affairs-tribes-lead-thebattle-to-combat-a-national-opioid-crisis.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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crisis44, as “[f]or centuries, [Native American communities] have suffered
from the effects of war, disease, forced relocation, famine, poverty and
intergenerational trauma—all of this reflect[ing] [] the poorest health
statistics of any racial group in the United States.”45 Between 1999 and
2015, overdose rates in Indian Country had increased by 500 percent. 46
Accordingly, one in ten Native American children will misuse prescription
opioids, a figure twice that of white children. 47 Their mothers, too, often
struggle with opioid abuse; indeed, “pregnant Native people are eight times
more likely to be diagnosed with opioid dependence than pregnant white
folks.”48 Native Americans make up only 2 percent of the U.S. population,
but they die of opioid overdose at the highest rate of any group in the
country.49 High use rates by Native Americans are likely tied to overprescription at Indian Health Service (IHS) facilities. 50 Many remote tribes
have a difficult time bringing in health professionals, and as a result,
receive “direct services” from IHS and must accept the method of pain
management that IHS provides.51
The crisis has forced many tribes to reallocate funds from important
programs—like housing and heating assistance—to fund the court system,
law enforcement, social services, and treatment programs to deal with the
ever-increasing number of people impacted by opioid use.52 In particular,
tribes are struggling to handle a significant increase in Indian Child Welfare
Act (ICWA) cases.53 That sharp increase in cases is alleged to be a result of
the opioid epidemic. 54 While most tribes do their best to place Native
children with family members or other tribal members, many are simply
running out of homes for placement. 55 Many kids end up in homes outside
of the tribe and risk losing the bond with their home and culture. 56
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Stephanie Valenzuela, In Plain Sight: How the Opioid Crisis Has Ravaged Indian
Country, LAKOTA PEOPLES LAW PROJECT (July 5, 2018), https://www.lakotalaw.org/news/
2018-07-05/opioid-crisis.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Brewer, supra note 39.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol43/iss2/3

No. 2]

COMMENT

359

Even the Cherokee Nation, one of the country’s largest Indian nations,
has been impacted by an increase of ICWA placements. 57 The Cherokee
Nation went from two ICWA cases per month to two dozen cases in a
matter of a few weeks. 58 Besides an increase in ICWA cases, government
services have been diminished as the number of overdoses continues to rise,
further raising the fear that tribal membership will dwindle over the long
term.59 The cornerstone of any tribe is the family unit, and as opioid use
breaks families apart, tribal membership will suffer as a result.
Along with its work across the United States, the Substance Abuse and
Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) also works specifically
with tribal governments to implement the five-point opioid strategy.60 The
five-point strategy as it relates to tribes is:


“Improving access to prevention, treatment, and recovery support
services.”61 SAMHSA accomplishes this by providing State
Targeted Response to Opioids Crisis Grants through the 21st
Century Cures Act.62 States can utilize these funds to pinpoint areas
of the most need. 63



“Targeting Overdose-Reversing Drugs.”64 SAMHSA has increased
access to naloxone, an effective overdose reversing drug, and
provides first responders and community leaders with access to the
“Opioid Overdose Prevention Toolkit.” 65



“Strengthening Public Health Data and Reporting.”66 SAMHSA
administers the National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH)
and provides the data collected to state and local officials.67 With

57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See Opioids in Indian Country: Beyond the Crisis to Healing the Community:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 115th Cong. 10 (2018), https://www.
indian.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/CHRG-115shrg32784.pdf (testimony of
Christopher Jones, Director, Nat’l Mental Health & Substance Use Pol’y Lab., Substance
Abuse & Mental Health Serv. Admin.) [hereinafter Jones Testimony].
61. Id. at 13.
62. Id.; see Pub. L. No. 114-255, 130 Stat. 1033 (2016).
63. Jones Testimony, supra note 60, at 13.
64. Id. at 14.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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this data, officials are able to better target high risk areas and
populations in order to effectively and efficiently target resources. 68
Through these resources, tribes have access to prevention programs,
including the Strategic Prevention Framework-Partnerships for Success
(SPF-PFS) grant program.69 Through the SPF-PFS grant, “First Nations
Community HealthSource has developed prevention strategies based on
research and tribal traditions” aiming to reduce prescription drug abuse,
educate tribal leadership on prevention strategies, and cultivate “a tribal
strengths-based method to decrease prescription drug abuse and misuse.” 70
Tribes also have access to grant money through the Opioid Response Grant
Fund, with a tribal set aside of $50 million, and the Medication-Assisted
Treatment for Prescription Drug and Opioid Abuse Program, with a tribal
set aside of $5 million. 71 These funds have given tribes the opportunity to
begin combating prescription-opioid misuse; unfortunately, however, a new
era in the opioid crisis has begun. While the federal government focuses its
response to the crisis on prescription-opioid abuse and data collection, the
third wave of the crisis—a shift from prescription opioids to illicitlymanufactured fentanyl—is already underway. 72
Determined to protect its people from this threat, the Cherokee Nation,
led by Attorney General Todd Hembree, began putting together the pieces
of the plan in the fall of 2016.73 AG Hembree assembled a task force to
build a case against the opioid industry. 74 He learned that opioid
manufacturers, although working as contractors for the IHS, were calling
the shots when it came to prescription patterns in Indian Country. 75 He also
discovered that “opioid manufacturers, distributors and pharmacies had
been operating virtually unchecked, paying relatively small fines for
violating laws intended to stop large shipments and suspiciously highvolume prescriptions.”76 Congress passed the Ensuring Patient Access and
68. Id. The remaining elements of the five-point strategy—“[s]upport cutting-edge
research that advances our understanding of pain and addiction,” id. at 13, and “[a]dvance
the practice of pain management to enable access to [effective] care,” id.—are not directly
related to the response in Indian country.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Valenzuela, supra note 46.
72. Understanding the Epidemic, supra note 23.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See id.
76. Id.
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Effective Drug Enforcement Act in 2016.77 AG Hembree believes that this
legislation has made it easier for opiates to enter the country because it
prevents the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) from stopping large or
suspicious shipments of opioids entering the United States. 78 Armed with
this information, AG Hembree and the Cherokee Nation stood ready to be
the “tip of the spear” in the battle against the opioid epidemic. 79 Since the
Nation filed suit in Cherokee Tribal Court in April 2017, hundreds of tribes
and other communities have filed suits of their own. 80 The action brought
by the Cherokee Nation does not just stand to impact the lives of Cherokee
members, but the suit also stands to impact the viability of other litigation
across the country; the importance of McKesson Corp. v. Hembree cannot
be understated.
II. Statement of the Case: McKesson Corp. v. Hembree
A. Facts
The Center for Disease Control reports that over 300,000 Americans
have died from opioid-involved drug overdoses;81 indeed, “[i]t is
undisputed that this nation is in the midst of an opioid crisis.” 82 Forty
percent of the opioid deaths in America have involved a prescription
opiate.83 The Cherokee Nation is particularly affected by the epidemic and,
like many other states and tribal nations, planned to litigate against several
defendants in the opioid industry.84
In 2016, the Cherokee Nation Legislature enacted the Cherokee Nation
Unfair and Deceptive Practices Act (CNUDPA). 85 The CNUDPA, part of
the Comprehensive Access to Justice Act (CAJA) of 2016, amended the
Cherokee Nation Civil Procedure Rules, allowing the Cherokee Nation to

77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.; “Plaintiffs [cities, counties, or states] in 46 actions move[d] under 28 U.S.C §
1407 to centralize pretrial proceedings . . . pending in nine districts.” In re Nat'l Prescription
Opiate Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 1375, 1376–77 (J.P.M.L. 2017).
81. Id.
82. McKesson Corp. v. Hembree, No. 17-CV-323-TCK-FHM, 2018 WL 340042, at *1
(N.D. Okla. Jan. 9, 2018).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Comprehensive Access to Justice Act, CHEROKEE NATION CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 21–
28 (2016).
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file a civil lawsuit against opioid defendants as parens patriae.86 In parens
patriae actions, “states seek ‘to protect or vindicate the state’s “quasisovereign” interests in the health, safety, and welfare of their citizens.’” 87
States have used the parens patriae principle successfully in other
instances, including recovering costs incurred as a result of tobacco use by
citizens.88 As a result of the tobacco litigation, forty-six states settled with
four tobacco companies in 1998. 89 The tobacco industry was able to defend
against individual lawsuits by asserting that the “smoker was aware of the
risks and decided to smoke anyway.” This defense was unsuccessful against
the states as parens patriae.90 AG Hembree planned to use the same
strategy for litigation in tribal court and hoped that, as a sovereign
government, the Cherokee Nation would obtain similar results as the states
in the tobacco litigation.
B. Procedural History
The Cherokee Nation filed suit in Cherokee District Court, naming six
pharmaceutical companies as defendants: CVS, Walgreens, and Wal-Mart
(Pharmacies); and McKesson, Cardinal Health, and AmerisourceBergen
(Distributors).91 The Nation "assert[ed] claims under CNUDPA and
common law claims for nuisance, negligence, unjust enrichment, and civil
conspiracy," alleging the pharmaceutical defendants “knowingly or
negligently distributed and dispensed prescription opioid drugs within the
Cherokee Nation in a manner that foreseeably injured . . . the Cherokee
Nation and its citizens.”92 The common law claims sought “injunctive
relief, imposition of civil penalties, compensatory and punitive damages,
restitution, and disgorgement.”93
The pharmaceutical companies filed an action challenging the tribal
court’s jurisdiction in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Oklahoma against AG Hembree, Judge Crystal R. Jackson,

86. McKesson, 2018 WL 340042, at *1; see Robert C. Batson, Addressing the Opioid
Crisis in Indian Country with A Parens Patriae Action in Tribal Court, 11 ALB. GOV'T L.
REV. 106, 116 (2018).
87. Batson, supra note 86, at 107.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 108.
91. McKesson, 2018 WL 340042, at *2 (citing Cherokee Nation v. McKesson Corp. et
al., No. CV-2017-203 (Cherokee Nation D. Ct. filed Apr. 20, 2017)).
92. Id.
93. Id.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol43/iss2/3

No. 2]

COMMENT

363

Judge T. Luke Barteaux, and Doe Judicial Officers 1-4.94 The
pharmaceutical companies sought a declaratory judgment that the Nation
lacked jurisdiction in tribal court. They also sought a preliminary injunction
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 to enjoin the Nation from
proceeding with the action in tribal court. 95
C. Opinion
Before addressing the primary issues in front of it, the court established
the standard for preliminary injunction, 96 then found that the tribal court's
lack of jurisdiction over the claims was "clear," holding that the
pharmaceutical companies met all the elements to warrant preliminary
injunction as to both the CNUPDA and common law claims. 97 The
companies were also able to show they did not need to exhaust tribal court
remedies before challenging the tribal court’s jurisdiction. 98
The court then addressed whether the pharmaceutical companies were
likely to succeed in their challenge of tribal jurisdiction. Success on the
merits in this case called for application of the tribal court jurisdictional rule
set forth in Montana v. United States. The Montana rule is subject to two
exceptions; the burden to prove one of the exceptions applies falls on the
party seeking to assert tribal jurisdiction—here, the Cherokee Nation. 99
Those two exceptions are as follows. First, “[a] tribe may regulate, through
taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial
dealings, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.” 100 Second, “[a] tribe
may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct
94. Id. The court indicates in footnote 2 that although the tribal parties asserted in
response to the companies’ complaint that only Judge Barteaux is assigned to hear the case
in tribal court, because Judge Jackson failed to file a motion seeking to be dismissed
pursuant to the local rules, she must remain a party to the action. Id. at *2 n.2.
95. Id. at *2.
96. Id. The court identified that the burden falls on the plaintiff to show that: (1) they
are likely to succeed on the merits of the claim; (2) they will undergo irreparable injury
without the injunction; (3) the threatened injury against the plaintiff would be greater
without the injunction than the defendants with it; (4) the injunction would not negatively
affect the public interest. Id. (citing N.M. Dep’t of Game & Fish v. U.S. Dep’t of the
Interior, 854 F.3d 1236, 1246 (10th Cir. 2017)).
97. Id. at *5, *9–11.
98. Id. at *5.
99. McKesson, 2018 WL 340042, at *3 (citing Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family
Land and Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 330 (2008).
100. Id. at *3 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981)).
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of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct
threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.” 101
In order for the pharmaceutical companies to “avoid exhaustion [they]
must ‘make a substantial showing of eligibility’ that one of the exceptions
[to the exhaustion rule] applies.”102 Those exceptions are: “(1) where an
assertion of tribal jurisdiction is motivated by a desire to harass or is
conducted in bad faith; (2) where the action is patently violative of express
jurisdictional prohibitions; . . . (3) where exhaustion would be futile
because of the lack of an adequate opportunity to challenge the court's
jurisdiction; [and] (4) where it is clear that the tribal court lacks jurisdiction
and that judicial proceedings would serve no purpose other than delay.”103
The companies contended that the CNUDPA was an inappropriate
attempt to enforce the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), and as such, tribal
jurisdiction over the claim was automatically foreclosed; the court
agreed. 104 The Cherokee Nation's enforcement was found to be private
because "unlike states, tribes do not have courts of general jurisdiction." 105
Additionally, the court found that because the companies are nonmembers,
and it is well established that the CSA may not be privately enforced, 106
“the lack of tribal court jurisdiction . . . [was] ‘so patently obvious as to
defy exhaustion.’”107
After denying the CNUDPA claims, the court found that the common
law claims fell outside of both Montana exceptions, denying the tribal court
jurisdiction over the claims as well. 108 Further, it explained that any
relationship between the Cherokee Nation and the companies was
sufficiently limited to prevent tribal court jurisdiction over the conduct. 109
Citing only the companies’ evidence, the court explained that the
relationship was separated by third parties, keeping any transactions at
101. Id. (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 566).
102. Id. at *4 (quoting Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Farley, 115 F.3d 1489, 1502 (10th Cir.
2011)).
103. Id. (quoting Thlopthlocco Tribal Town v. Stidham, 762 F.3d 1226, 1238 (10th Cir.
2014)).
104. Id. at *5.
105. Id. (citation omitted).
106. Id. (citing Jones v. Hobbs, 745 F. Supp. 2d 886, 890–94 (E.D. Ark. 2010); Hatfield
v. Arbor Springs Health & Rehab Center, No. 3-12CV528-MHT, 2012 WL 4476612, at *3
(M.D. Ala. Sept. 4, 2012)).
107. Id. (quoting Thlopthlocco Tribal Town, 762 F.3d at 1239).
108. Id. at *6–9.
109. Id. at *6.
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arm’s length. 110 In conclusion, because there is no apparent nexus between
the claims made and any consensual relationship, the court held that the
common law claims fall outside the first Montana exception. 111
D. Analysis
The district court’s decision in McKesson is a far cry from where federal
Indian policy stood almost 200 years ago. In the case of Worcester v.
Georgia, the Supreme Court set the relationship between the states and
tribes as one of “political independence.” 112 In McKesson, the court’s
decision that the CNUPDA was a private enforcement of the CSA is
illustrative of how differently the court views tribes from state or even local
governments. The court found fault in the Cherokee Nation’s use of the
CSA as advisory in the passage of its own laws. 113 The court analyzed the
issue as though the federal government is far superior to the Tribe. AG
Hembree asserted in response that the Tribe can utilize the CSA in its
legislation the same way that a state can because the statue expressly denies
field preemption over a state’s ability to regulate controlled substances. 114
However, the district court denied this claim because the tribal court lacked
general jurisdiction.
In McKesson, the court analyzed the Montana rule to determine whether
tribal court jurisdiction was appropriate in the case. The court held that the
first Montana exception did not apply. 115 It relied on evidence provided by
the companies in the case that indicated the relationship was “simply
routine business or consumer transactions.” 116 The argument certainly exists
that the court unfairly favored the companies’ evidence without considering
the factual dispute arising from the evidence presented by AG Hembree—in
particular, the service of the Cherokee Nation Health Plan by the

110. Id. (“This evidence indicates that at most, any relationship[] between Plaintiffs and
the Cherokee Nation or its members [is] simply routine business or consumer transactions.”).
The court goes on to provide several cases that applied the first Montana exception. Id. at *7
(citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 233 (1959); Cardin v. De La Cruz, 671 F.2d 363,
366–67 (9th Cir. 1982)).
111. Id. at *7.
112. James A. Casey, Note, Sovereignty by Sufferance: The Illusion of Indian Tribal
Sovereignty, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 404, 410–11 (1994).
113. McKesson, 2018 WL 340042, at *5 (“However, courts have rejected private
attempts to enforce the CSA through other vehicles.”).
114. Id.
115. Id. at *6–7.
116. Id. at *6.
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companies.117 The Cherokee Nation Health Plan is the largest tribally
operated health care system in the United States. 118 Administering the
prescription drug program for the health plan, even through a third-party
contract, should constitute an intentional relationship to satisfy the Montana
exception.
The court’s rejection of the second Montana exception is more
questionable than the first. Even though the exception “is a narrow one,”
the refusal to allow AG Hembree to even present any evidence to a jury of
whether the Plaintiffs’ conduct “imperil[ed] the subsistence of the tribal
community[]” limited the capacity of the Cherokee Nation to protect its
citizens.119 The court diminished the evidence of the harm caused by the
opioid crisis to the Cherokee Nation; this treatment of the Tribe is
emblematic of the larger problem of the federal-tribal relationship. The
safety and well-being of tribes and tribal members has always been
secondary to the maintenance of the power structure of the federal
government. The difference between this case and jurisdictional battles
between tribes and federal or state governments is that here the court
willfully ignored the evidence of serious harm, choosing instead to protect
the interests of a group of some of the world’s largest corporations.
The second Montana exception is narrow, applying to “situations where
the conduct of the nonmember poses a direct threat to tribal sovereignty.” 120
Indeed, “[t]he nonmember’s conduct must be ‘catastrophic for tribal selfgovernment.’”121 The court distinguished two cases put forward by the
Tribe and found that, despite the significant harm that has been caused to
the Cherokee Nation by the opioid epidemic, the conduct alleged did not
reach the level required to grant tribal jurisdiction. 122
The court declined to apply exhaustion to the common law claims either,
finding that the companies are nonmembers and the defendants failed to
make a legitimate argument that either Montana exception applied. 123 In
conclusion, the court found that the companies were likely to succeed on
117. Id.
118. About Health Services, CHEROKEE NATION, https://www.cherokee.org/Services/
Health/About-Health-Services (last visited Mar. 5, 2019).
119. McKesson, 2018 WL 340042, at *7.
120. Id. at *8 (quoting Phillip Morris USA, Inc. v. King Mountain Tobacco Co., 569 F.
3d 932, 943 (9th Cir. 2009)).
121. Id. (quoting Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S.
316, 341 (2008)).
122. Id. at *9. It appears that the court did not analyze the plaintiffs’ evidence as to the
second Montana exception and provided no affirmative justification for its decision.
123. Id.
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the claim that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction and that exhaustion need
not be required. 124
In determining whether to issue an injunction against the tribal court, the
court looked to whether the companies would suffer irreparable injury
absent an injunction. The court appeared to discount promises made by the
Tribe that would have prevented the very harm that it deemed necessitated
an injunction.125 Even though the tribe had agreed to honor any
requirements put upon it by the federal court, because the tribe failed to
waive sovereign immunity, the court determined that the companies may
face irreparable harm.126 This notion comes despite an order from the
Cherokee Nation District Court that stated “the defendants in that case (the
Plaintiffs here) ‘shall not be required to post any appeal or supersedeas
bond’ . . . and ‘may seek a stay of execution of any judgment of this Court
pending appeal without the posting of a supersedeas bond.”127 Despite the
tribal court order, as well as a concession from the Tribe that it would honor
any additional protections imposed by the federal court, the court found that
irreparable harm “is both great and non-speculative” due to the “plain terms
of its own law.”128
Next, the discussion moved to whether the Tribes’ risk of injury without
the injunction outweighed the Companies’ risk of injury with the
injunction.129 The court disposed of this issue by finding that the Tribe
could assert its claims in another forum; thus, injury was unlikely. 130
Accordingly, the risk of injury to the companies outweighed the risk to the
Tribe. Finally, the court determined that the injunction would not adversely
impact the public interest.131 Because the tribal court clearly lacked
jurisdiction, public interest was not served to allow the tribal court to make
findings on the matter.132
The opioid crisis continues to ravage Indian Country, but the court at no
point acknowledged the damage being done to the Cherokee Nation and its
124. Id.
125. Id. at *10.
126. Id. (“Due to tribal sovereign immunity, Plaintiffs may be unable to sue the Cherokee
Nation for return of the bond funds even if a federal court later found that the tribal court
lacked jurisdiction.”).
127. Id. (quoting Notice of Entry of Tribal Court Ordinance on Bond Issue, Doc. 130, at
2).
128. Id. at *10, *11.
129. Id. at *11.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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citizens. Instead, the court held that the Tribe was more risk averse than the
companies because “the Cherokee Nation could assert claims to redress any
injury in another, non-tribal forum.”133
The potential injury to the companies acknowledged by the court refers
to the Cherokee Nation’s failure to waive sovereign immunity with regards
to a bond that the companies would have to post on appeal of the tribal
court ruling.134 This justification is faulty in two ways. First, it presumes
that the tribal court would indeed find for the Tribe in the case. While that
is certainly a highly likely outcome, to base a decision of this magnitude on
an assumption of that nature is equally irregular and inappropriate.
Second, it ignores both an order from the tribal court that the companies
would not be required to post such a bond and a statement by AG Hembree
that he would agree with any other protections recommended by the district
court. To flatly ignore these good faith efforts and then claim that the
“scenario is premised not on an assumption of bad faith by the Cherokee
Nation” is a gravely misguided interpretation of the case.135 The Cherokee
Nation wanted to defend its citizens in a forum it knows will be fair to the
Tribe. Throughout history, both state and federal courts have been unkind
to tribes.136 Tribal courts are a means of leveling the playing field between
tribal plaintiffs and non-Indian defendants. To suggest that a tribe can
simply make its claim in another forum, either state or federal, comes
dangerously close to the language used in the assimilation era that caused
great harm to Indians.137 Additionally, as this comment will discuss in Part
IV, the Cherokee Nation would lose its choice of forum altogether.
E. Discussion
The opioid crisis has harmed Native Americans in more catastrophic
ways than any other group in America. This harm can be directly attributed
to the long history of the federal-tribal relationship and the disruptive
policies of the United States government. The very survival of tribal
governance is at stake in this case; it is imperative that the Cherokee Nation
be allowed to see this matter through in tribal court. It is important to
understand the backdrop against which the district court in McKesson was
working from in order to evaluate its decision. It is equally important to
133. Id.
134. Id. at *10.
135. Id.
136. See Sharon O'Brien, Tribes and Indians: With Whom Does the United States
Maintain A Relationship?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1461, 1465–66 (1991).
137. See id.
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understand the historical context of federal Indian law to best analyze and
critique the district court’s opinion. The analysis will assert that these
decisions gradually diminished the status of Indian tribes from that of a
state to that of a local government. This historical context shaped the way
the Montana decision is applied and as a result, Montana is too often used
to rule against tribal sovereignty. Accordingly, the district court should
have applied the exhaustion doctrine so that the tribal court could fulfill its
duty to protect its citizens. The Supreme Court in the case of National
Farmers Union Insurance Companies v. Crow Tribe of Indians created the
exhaustion doctrine so that tribal courts could assess their own jurisdiction
in civil cases before a federal court can review any jurisdictional issue. 138
The Court justified its decision in part because a fully developed record
from the tribal court would serve “the orderly administration of justice in
the federal court,” and in order for that record to be developed, the federal
courts should “stay[] its hand” until the tribal courts have the opportunity to
“exhaust” their own remedies.139 This decision created the exhaustion
doctrine, which made it a requirement for tribal courts to fully determine
their own jurisdiction before a federal court can review a claim that the
tribal court exceeded its authority. The district court in McKesson should
have applied the exhaustion doctrine, if for no other reason to serve “the
orderly administration of justice in federal court[.]” 140 The stakes were too
high in this case to continue down the path toward destruction of tribal
jurisdiction.
1. Tribal Jurisdiction and the Incoherence of Supreme Court
Jurisprudence; Or, There and Back Again
The Supreme Court’s failure to establish cogent jurisprudence in its
tribal court jurisdiction decisions has weakened the notion of tribal
jurisdiction.141 The Court’s jurisprudence has wavered between respect for
tribal courts and assertions of “judicial plenary power.”142 These waves
have given lower courts space to exercise discretion in a manner that limits
tribal jurisdiction in significant ways.

138. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
139. Id. at 856–57.
140. Id.
141. Frank Pommersheim, "Our Federalism" in the Context of Federal Courts and Tribal
Courts: An Open Letter to the Federal Courts' Teaching and Scholarly Community, 71 U.
COLO. L. REV. 123, 129 (2000).
142. Id. at 128.
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In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, the Court diminished tribal
courts’ criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who commit crimes on tribal
land.143 The petitioners in the case were arraigned in Suquamish Indian
Provisional Court on criminal charges; they filed writs of habeas corpus in
the United States Western District of Washington, claiming the tribal court
did not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.144 In response to the
writ, the Tribe acknowledged that Congress or a treaty had not granted
specific authorization, but asserted that “such jurisdiction flows
automatically from the Tribe’s retained inherent powers of government
over the Port Madison Indian Reservation.” 145 While the district court found
for the petitioners, the Ninth Circuit reversed in favor of the Tribe, after
which the Supreme Court granted certiorari.146
In its opinion, the Supreme Court made clear that, absent authorization
by Congress, the Tribe does not have inherent authority over nonIndians.147 The Court found that the assertion of any non-delegated
jurisdiction by the tribal court contradicts subordination of the tribes to the
United States government.148 The reasoning of the Court is cyclical: Indian
tribes have no inherent jurisdiction over non-Indians within the borders of
their reservations because they forfeited full sovereignty in exchange for the
protection of the United States. The tribes, however, only needed the
protection of the United States because of the destruction of tribal
governments by the United States government. In this way, the United
States created the conditions under which the tribes were practically forced
to forfeit that sovereignty. The Court also relies on the fact that the “Indians
are within the geographical limits of the United States,” and as such, “[t]he
soil and people within these limits are under the political control of the
Government of the United States . . . .”149 This reasoning further diminished
the tribes from being equivalent to the states, making them more akin to
“cities, counties, and other organized bodies with limited legislative
functions.”150 Oliphant was the first in a series of Supreme Court decisions
that would diminish tribal jurisdiction.

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

435 U.S. 191, 195 (1978).
Id.
Id. at 196 (internal quotation omitted).
Id. at 195.
Id. at 211.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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While the case of United States v. Lara seemed to overrule Oliphant,151
the reasoning in Oliphant would survive even if it produced contradictory
results as related to the parties. The petitioner in Lara was a nonmember
Indian who was expelled from the Spirit Lake Reservation for numerous
instances of wrongdoing; he ignored the order, and when apprehended by
federal officials, he struck and injured one of the officers. 152 The petitioner
was convicted in Spirit Lake Tribal Court for “violence to a policeman” and
was also charged in the Federal District Court for the District Court of
North Dakota for a corresponding federal crime.153 The petitioner
challenged the federal charge by claiming that he was protected by the
double jeopardy clause.154 To this claim, the government responded that
because the prosecutions were brought by separate sovereigns, double
jeopardy protection was precluded. 155
The Court’s opinion did not reject the reasoning that it utilized in
Oliphant. Rather, the Court recognized that when Congress passed 25
U.S.C. § 1301(2),156 it “enlarge[d] the tribes’ own powers of selfgovernment to include the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby
recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians,
including nonmembers.”157 The Court held that because Congress intended
to give “inherent tribal sovereignty” rather than “delegated federal
authority” to prosecute Indians to the tribes, dual sovereignty applied,
which would preclude the petitioner’s double jeopardy claim. 158 The Court
went on to explain that Congress had the authority to delegate such
151. See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 196 (2004).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 196–97.
154. U.S. CONST. amend. V. (“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”).
155. Lara, 541 U.S. at 197 (describing the holding in Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88
(1985)) (“[T]he Double Jeopardy Clause reflects the ‘common-law conception of crime as
an offense against the sovereignty of the government’; when ‘a defendant in a single act
violates the “peace and dignity” of two sovereigns by breaking the laws of each, he has
committed two distinct “offences”’ . . . .”).
156. The section states in full:
“[P]owers of self-government” means and includes all governmental powers
possessed by an Indian tribe, executive, legislative, and judicial, and all offices,
bodies, and tribunals by and through which they are executed, including courts
of Indian offenses; and means the inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby
recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.
25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2018).
157. Lara, 541 U.S. at 198 (internal quotations and emphasis omitted).
158. Id. at 199.
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“inherent sovereignty,” and that the opinion in Lara was consistent with its
other opinions that found the authority to prosecute nonmembers had been
“part of the tribal sovereignty that was divested by treaties and by
Congress.”159
While the Court in Lara appeared to err on the side of self-determination
by Indian Tribes, the Court did not go far enough to insulate its decision
from future intervention by either the Court or Congress. The Court used
shaky logic, at best, to uphold Congress’s authority to legislatively give
tribes inherent power of self-determination. For a power to be inherent in
something, the thing must exist in and of its self in order for the power to
exist at all; if Congress has the discretion to take away and then give back
the tribe’s jurisdictional authority, it is hardly an inherent power. Rather, it
is a power that the tribes hold at the behest of Congress. Thus, if the Court’s
first holding—that criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians is an
inherent tribal power—then the second holding—that Congress can
legislatively change tribal jurisdiction—cannot stand. The Supreme Court’s
unwillingness to put its foot down when it comes to the inherent
sovereignty of Indian tribes in Oliphant and Lara has played a major role in
the continued diminishment of tribal jurisdiction. A tribe’s authority over
criminal matters that occur against its citizens or within its territories is
perhaps the most fundamental to the protection of the health and safety of
tribal citizens. If the Supreme Court was willing to so easily limit that
authority as they did in Oliphant and Lara, they wouldn’t blink twice to do
the same to civil jurisdiction.
The holding in Montana v. United States160 attempted to reign in the
meandering jurisprudence in the field of federal Indian law. however, it
actually placed significant discretion within the federal court system to
determine when tribal court jurisdiction is appropriate. Similar to Lara,
while Montana, though operating in the civil context, again attempted to
give tribal courts more opportunities to assert jurisdiction, it actually further
limited the “inherent” sovereignty vested in the tribes.
Montana involved a challenge by the State of Montana against the Crow
Tribe of Montana’s power to limit hunting and fishing by nonmembers on
non-Indian property within reservation boundaries. 161 The dispute centered
around two issues: first, the ownership of the banks and bed of the Big
159. Id. at 205 (distinguishing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978);
Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 209–10 (1978); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676,
686 (1990)).
160. 450 U.S. 544, 547 (1981).
161. Id.
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Horn River; second, whether the Tribe’s inherent sovereignty gave it the
authority to regulate and/or prohibit the activity in question. 162 The United
States, acting on behalf of the Tribe, claimed that the government
“conveyed beneficial ownership of the riverbed to the Crow Tribe by the
treaties of 1851 or 1868, and therefore continues to hold the land in trust for
the use and benefit of the Tribe.”163 Montana claimed that the United States
did not hold the land in trust by treaty, but it rather “retained ownership of
the riverbed as public land which then passed to the State of Montana upon
its admission to the Union.”164 The Court held that the United States
presumptively maintains the title to the riverbed under any navigable river,
regardless of whether the government conveys the land surrounding and
including the river.165 Thus, the Court found that the riverbed land is held in
trust by the government for future states “when they enter the Union and
assume sovereignty on an equal footing with the established States.” 166
Because the ownership of navigable riverbeds is “so strongly identified
with the sovereign power of government,” any transfer to an entity other
than a future state can only be completed to fulfill “some international duty
or public exigency.”167 The Court held that the treaties between the Crow
Tribe and the United States were insufficient to overcome the
presumption. 168 Thus, the United States retained the land in trust until it was
conveyed to the State of Montana.169 In deciding this issue, the Court
developed a balancing test to determine whether it would be prudent for the
Tribe to assert jurisdiction in the matter.
Courts often use the Montana test to justify decisions that although
perhaps not expressly intentional, ultimately disfavor tribal jurisdiction. The
Montana test attempts to allow for more nuanced decisions regarding tribal
jurisdiction. This approach does not support the Court’s decisions in Lara,
above, and National Farmers Union Insurance Companies v. Crow Tribe of
Indians, below, which stand for the principle that tribal sovereignty is
inherent. If the Court wanted to uphold the principle that tribal sovereignty
is inherent, then nuance is the last thing the Court should bring into the fold.

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 557.
Id. at 551.
Id.
Id. at 555.
Id. at 551 (internal quotation omitted).
Id. at 552 (quoting United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55 (1926)).
Id. at 554.
Id.
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A balancing test is adversative to an inherent power of a sovereign
government.170
National Farmers Union Insurance Companies v. Crow Tribe of Indians
demonstrates the Court’s intent to support tribal court jurisdiction. 171 The
case involved a suit in Crow Tribal Court filed by a member of the Tribe
against a non-Indian.172 The defendant’s insurance provider filed suit in the
District Court of Montana, asserting a lack of jurisdiction by the tribal
court.173 The district court sided with the defendant and entered an
injunction to prevent further action in the tribal court.174
On appeal, the appellate court reversed the injunction, holding that the
District Court of Montana did not have jurisdiction to order the injunction,
and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if the district court
had jurisdiction over the request pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.175 Justice
Stevens wrote for the Court and held that because the issue involved a
federal question, the district court properly asserted jurisdiction. 176 “[T]he
question [of] whether a tribal court has the power to exercise civil subjectmatter jurisdiction over non-Indians . . . should [be examined] in the first
instance in the Tribal Court itself.” 177 The Court refused to apply the
reasoning from Oliphant and expressed a desire to develop a doctrine that
would align with the federal policy supporting self-governance and selfdetermination.178
The case of Strate v. A-1 Contractors involved a jurisdictional question
regarding a traffic accident that occurred on a North Dakota state highway
running through the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation. 179 The action was
originally brought in tribal court against one of the drivers and his employer
for damages sustained during the accident. 180 Neither the plaintiff,

170. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE
L.J. 943, 1004 (1987) (“Balancing has turned us away from the Constitution, supplying
‘reasonable’ policymaking in lieu of theoretical investigations of rights, principles and
structures.”)
171. 471 U.S. 845, 847 (1985).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 853.
177. Id. at 855–56.
178. Id. at 856.
179. See 520 U.S. 438, 442 (1997).
180. Id. at 443.
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defendant, or defendant’s employer were members of the Tribe. 181 The
respondents made appearances in tribal court to challenge the tribal court’s
personal and subject-matter jurisdiction over the matter.182 The respondents
sought an injunction in the district court, where the court found the tribal
court had jurisdiction based on the decision in National Farmers Union
Insurance Companies v. Crow Tribe of Indians.183 The Eighth Circuit
affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.184
In its analysis, the Court attempted to explain the recent history of Indian
law jurisprudence at the Supreme Court. The Court held that the decision in
National Farmers does not make the jurisdictional analysis in Montana
inapplicable and that the rule in National Farmers is nothing “more than a
prudential exhaustion rule, in deference to the capacity of tribal courts to
explain to the parties the precise basis for accepting or rejecting
jurisdiction.”185 This decision contradicts the language in National
Farmers, which states that “exhaustion is required before such a claim may
be entertained in a federal court.”186 National Farmers explicitly required
exhaustion in federal court. The Court in Strate did not overrule the
exhaustion doctrine in National Farmers, but held the rule is less stringent
than what the language in National Farmers required. The Court instead
used the Montana rule, finding that tribal jurisdiction over the matter was
not “necessary to protect tribal self-government.”187
The Supreme Court has wavered between decisions that support tribal
jurisdiction, decisions that outwardly support tribal jurisdiction but
inwardly work to limit it, and decisions that on their face cause damage to
tribal jurisdiction. This wavering has created a body of federal case law that
has limited tribal jurisdiction. While the Supreme Court consistently alludes
to tribes’ “inherent sovereignty,” it nevertheless continues to rule in ways to
diminish that authority. For a power to be inherent, it must be so vital to the
tribes that they would fail to exist without it. McKesson is a perfect example
of a case where the Montana rule and the Strate prudential exhaustion rule
have combined to threaten not only tribal sovereignty, but an Indian tribe’s
very way of life. These rules have narrowed the window through which a
181. Id.
182. Id. at 444.
183. Id. at 444–45 (citing Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845
(1985)).
184. Id. at 445.
185. Id. at 450 (Internal quotations omitted).
186. Nat’l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 857.
187. Strate, 520 U.S. at 459.
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federal court may view tribal jurisdiction. That window is now so small that
a public health crisis—which gave cause for a presidential emergency
declaration—is not enough to trigger Montana’s second exception. The
court in Mckesson should have required the opioid defendants to exhaust
their remedies in tribal court. Not only is that the “prudential” decision,
Tenth Circuit precedent also indicates that it is the correct course of action.
Doing so is the only way to both promote the inherent sovereignty of the
Cherokee Nation and protect its way of life from the opioid crisis.
2. The Role of the Exhaustion Doctrine
The opioid crisis represents such a grave threat to tribal selfgovernance—and the tribal way of life—that the only legitimate option to
prevent severe damage to those interests is to apply the exhaustion
doctrine. 188 The opioid crisis has caused the overdose rate among Indians to
increase by 500 percent in the last decade. That increase is the highest
among racial groups in the United States. For the district court to claim that
“[a]ny potential injury to the Cherokee Nation does not outweigh the
certain and great injury to Plaintiffs if the Court does not enjoin the Tribal
Court Action” is to ignore the fact that over 120,000 tribal members are
misusing opiates. 189 The district court’s failure to realize the gravity of the
situation facing the Cherokee Nation illustrates how the exhaustion doctrine
can be effective in balancing the Tribe’s wish to assert sovereignty with the
federal courts interest in “orderly administration of justice.” 190
Additionally, without the benefit of a record from the tribal court, the
district court had a limited set of facts upon which to make its decision. The
opinion in McKesson is decidedly void of any substantive factual
justifications for its decision.191 Had the district court stayed its decision
until the tribal remedies were exhausted, the record upon de novo review of
the tribal court’s “construction of jurisdictional limitations” would have
been far more robust than the review for preliminary injunction. 192
188. See Phillip Allen White, Comment, The Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine: "Just Stay on
the Good Roads, and You've Got Nothing to Worry About", 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 65, 68
(1997).
189. McKesson Corp. v. Hembree, No. 17-CV-323-TCK-FHM, 2018 WL 340042, at *11
(N.D. Okla. Jan. 9, 2018).
190. Nat'l Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856.
191. McKesson, 2018 WL 340042, at *3–11.
192. See Timothy W. Joranko, Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies in the Lower Courts After
National Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual: Toward a Consistent Treatment of Tribal Courts
by the Federal Judicial System, 78 MINN. L. REV. 259, 295 (1993); McKesson, 2018 WL
340042, at *2.
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Another reason to apply the exhaustion doctrine is to provide consistency
surrounding issues of tribal jurisdiction. 193 Following National Farmers,
federal district courts and federal circuit courts began to formalize their
processes when reviewing tribal jurisdiction. 194 The decision in Strate
destroyed that consistency, which has created a lack of trust in the judicial
system.
Although the Supreme Court in Strate sharply limited the reach of the
exhaustion doctrine by making it prudential, it plainly left the doctrine
intact. In fact, the Court acknowledged that the two exceptions in Montana
still apply. 195 The district court in McKesson still had the option to decide
that the exhaustion doctrine was appropriate. Indeed, when the Supreme
Court stated that it “[did] not extract from National Farmers anything more
than a prudential exhaustion rule,” it still expected lower courts to consider
exhaustion.196 The Court indicated that exhaustion is a way to ensure that
the reviewing court has a full record to serve “the orderly administration of
justice,” to avoid “procedural nightmare[s],” to “encourage tribal courts to
explain to the parties the precise basis for accepting jurisdiction,” and to
“provide other courts with the benefit of their expertise in such matters.”197
The Tenth Circuit case of Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Farley illustrates how
Strate did not eliminate the exhaustion doctrine requirement on all tribal
jurisdiction matters, but rather was a narrow ruling pertaining to a particular
fact scenario. 198 In Kerr-McGee Corp., the Tenth Circuit stated that the
Supreme Court in Strate was not seeking to “identify an express
jurisdictional prohibition, but rather was in the position to address whether
tribal adjudicatory power remains over civil disputes involving
nonmembers on state highways within the reservation.”199 Thus, Strate did
not apply because the federal plaintiffs had already exhausted their
remedies in tribal court, where the plaintiffs in Kerr-McGee Corp. had not.
The Tenth Circuit went on to review the comity concerns for tribal
sovereignty and applied the exhaustion rule. 200 It found that “absent
overwhelming countervailing concerns[]” tribal courts should be allowed to
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
(1985).
198.
199.
200.

Id. at 307.
Id.
See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997).
Id. at 450.
Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Companies v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856
115 F.3d 1498, 1507 (1997).
Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 1509.
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try cases that are within their jurisdiction and allege injury to tribal
members.201 The Cherokee Nation has satisfied these requirements in
McKesson. The court in McKesson should have ruled in favor of allowing
the tribal court to decide if the issues alleged by the Cherokee Nation
allowed for tribal jurisdiction. “Even Strate and Montana, cases that
curtailed tribal authority over non-Indians, recognized that tribes retain a
core sovereign interest in protecting the health and welfare of the
tribe . . . .”202
III. Statement of the Case: In re National
Prescription Opiate Litigation
A. Procedural History
Following its defeat in federal court, the Cherokee Nation filed similar
litigation in the District Court of Sequoyah County, Oklahoma. 203 In this
action, the Cherokee Nation asserted only state law claims against the
opioid defendants in response to the same factual scenario as McKesson.204
With the number of potential actions against common opioid defendants
increasing, plaintiffs in forty-six federal actions moved the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation to centralize the pretrial proceedings in sixtyfour actions across nine districts.205 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, actions
involving common questions of fact that are pending in different federal
districts may be combined. These claims will be assigned to a judge or
judges by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation. 206 In this case, the
multidistrict litigation (MDL) was assigned to the Federal District Court for
the Northern District of Ohio.
Following the creation of the MDL, opioid defendant McKesson
removed the Oklahoma state case to the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Oklahoma pursuant to the Federal Officer Removal
Statute.207 The motion was considered in the Federal District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, due to the MDL.
201. Id. at 1508.
202. Id.
203. In re Nat'l Prescription Opiate Litig., 327 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1068 (N.D. Ohio 2018).
Although the case resolves two separate motions from similarly situated tribal nations, this
Comment will only discuss the opinion as it relates to the Cherokee Nation.
204. Id.
205. In re Nat'l Prescription Opiate Litig., 290 F. Supp. 3d 1375 (J.P.M.L. 2017).
206. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b) (2018).
207. Nat'l Prescription Opiate Litig., 327 F. Supp. 3d at 1068 (citing 28 U.S.C § 1442).
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B. Opinion
1. Issue Framing/Holding
The district court established that when applying the federal officer
removal statute, it is free to use its own circuit’s precedent. 208 As a result,
the court applied Sixth Circuit precedent to the Cherokee Nation case. 209
“[T]he Sixth Circuit has endorsed ‘the broad scope of the federal officer
removal statute’ . . . .”210 In order to determine whether or not removal
applies to a private corporate defendant, the defendant must show that “(1)
it is a person who acted under the direction of a federal officer; (2) the
actions for which it is being sued were performed under the color of federal
office, and (3) there is a colorable federal defense to the plaintiff’s
claims.”211 The court held that even though this case was a "close call," the
facts asserted by the McKesson were sufficient to meet the “liberal
construction of the federal officer removal statute mandated by the Supreme
Court.”212
2. Reasoning
The first step for the court was to find that McKesson was “acting under”
a federal officer because of their contract with the Veterans Administration
(VA).213 Private contractors are said to be acting under a federal officer
when the contractor “is helping the Government to produce an item that it
needs, [and] in the absence of a contract with a private firm, the
Government itself would have had to perform [the contracted job].”214 In
this case, the district court agreed with McKesson that their contract with
the VA represented an “unusually close relationship . . . due to monitoring
and oversight of the PPV Contract by a Contracting Officer.” 215 Were it not
for the contract with McKesson, the court explained that the VA would
have had to handle the distribution and storage of drugs itself. 216 As a result,

208. Id. (citing In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of September 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171,
1186 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 1069 (quoting Bennett v. MIS Corp., 607 F.3d 1076, 1084 (6th Cir. 2010)).
211. Id. (citing Bennett, 607 F.3d at 1085).
212. Id. at 1076.
213. Id. at 1071–72.
214. Id. at 1070 (citing Watson v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc., 551 U.S. 142, 154
(2007)).
215. Id. at 1071.
216. Id. at 1076.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019

380

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

McKesson was acting under a federal officer for purposes of the federal
officer removal statute.
The next consideration was whether McKesson was acting under the
“color of federal office”; according to the District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio, Eastern Division, the conduct for which the McKesson
was being sued indeed occurred under color of federal office. 217 This
element requires a “causal nexus” between the claims and conduct out of
which the action arises.218 The court found that the Tribal plaintiff’s claims
“put all prescription opioids at issue . . . including those opioids supplied
pursuant to the PPV contract.”219
Finally, the court found that McKesson asserted a colorable federal
defense.220 The court agreed with McKesson that the “government
contractor defense” is a plausible federal defense. 221 The court also
discussed some of the potential policy issues with removing the case to
federal court. It dismissed the tribal plaintiff’s argument that removal in the
instant case would allow McKesson to seek removal of cases brought by
state attorney generals.222 The court reasoned that because neither
McKesson or any of the other opioid defendants removed any state cases
under the federal officer removal statute, it is unlikely that they would do so
following this action. 223
C. Analysis
To justify its decision that McKesson “acted under the direction of a
federal officer,” the court focused on some of the details of the
pharmaceutical prime vendor (PPV) Contract between McKesson and the

217. Id.
218. Id. (citing Watson, 551 U.S. at 148).
219. Id. at 1077.
220. Id. at 1077–78 (citing Bennett v. MIS Corp., 607 F.3d 1076, 1089 (6th Cir. 2010)
(“[W]e have stated that a colorable federal defense need only be plausible, and that a district
court is not required to determine its validity at the time of removal.”) (citations omitted)).
221. Id. at 1078 (“The government contractor defense applies when: ‘(a) the United
States approved reasonably precise specifications; (b) the equipment conformed to those
specifications; and (c) the supplier warned the United States about dangers in the use of the
equipment known to the supplier but not to the United States.’”) (quoting Boyle v. United
Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 501 (1988)).
222. Id.
223. Id. The court did acknowledge that McKesson had removed a case brought by the
Commonwealth of Kentucky, but that McKesson subsequently agreed for the case to be
remanded to state court. Id.
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VA, as well as the Indian Health Service (IHS). 224 The PPV contract
requires that “[t]he Government will witness products received at the
loading docks (or specified delivery location) and sign delivery receipt
documents before the PPV driver departs.”225 The court acknowledges that
the level of supervision in the PPV contract falls short of the case it cites in
support, Bennet v. MIS Corp., but brushes the issue to the side because “the
PPV Contract provides recourse in the event the government is not satisfied
with an order.”226 However, the court fails to provide examples of what this
recourse entails. Rather, to further justify the relationship, the court made
the claim that a fine on McKesson not based on the contract is further proof
that “McKesson’s actions are heavily monitored and regulated.” 227
To say that the PPV contract is both so regulated by the government that
McKesson “cannot act (i.e., distribute) without direction from the VA[,]” 228
while simultaneously acknowledging that the contract does not meet the
level of “supervision and involvement” of the government in the Bennett
case is a questionable contention on its own. For the court to then claim that
McKesson is adequately supervised by the contract because of a fine not
based on the contract, it is unclear what the actions support the decision.
The Cherokee Nation’s primary contention against McKesson has
always been that actions taken by the company, whether negligent or
willful, allowed for massive amounts of opioids to be diverted into Indian
Country in violation of the PPV contract. In particular, the Tribe claims that
because the alleged conduct violated the PPV contract, there is no causal
nexus between the contract and the alleged conduct. 229 However, the court
did away with this particular allegation because it was made against the
“acting under” prong, and this prong “is not concerned with the specific
actions actually taken by McKesson . . . .”230 Thus, the court did not
consider the allegation that McKesson violated the contract as related to the
“causal nexus” prong.

224. Id. at 1070.
225. Id. at 1071 (quoting document 29-3 of document no. 1:18-OP-45695 at 40).
226. Id. at 1071.
227. Id. McKesson was fined $150 million in 2017 for “failing to ‘design and implement
an effective system to detect and report “suspicious orders” for controlled substances’ . . . .”
Id. (citing document 15-1 of docket no. at 1).
228. Id. (quoting document 29 of docket no. 1:18-OP-45695 at 13).
229. Id. at 1077.
230. Id. at 1075.
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Finally, as to the federal officer removal statute, the court determined
that McKesson met the “relatively low bar” of the colorable federal defense
prong with its assertion of the government contractor defense.231
D. Discussion
The Cherokee Nation is one of only two tribes to bring an action against
the pharmaceutical defendants in tribal court. Despite its best efforts to
avoid federal court, the Nation will find itself in federal court following the
denial of its remand motion in In re National Prescription Opiate Litigation.
The court began its analysis by explaining that “[w]hile some circuits have
taken a more narrow view of removal under the federal officer removal
statute, the Sixth Circuit has endorsed the broad scope of the . . .
statute . . . .”232
The liberal construction of the federal officer removal statute tips the
scales to McKesson and is especially problematic when the defendant is a
large corporation. The stated intent of the federal officer removal statute is
to allow federal officers the opportunity to assert federal defenses against
the claims that are raised.233 All of the Cherokee Nation’s claims in state
court are state law claims. While it is true that federal courts are courts of
general jurisdiction and can preside over state law claims, state courts are
also courts of general jurisdiction, so there is no reason that the state court
cannot hear the federal defense.
The outcome of In re National Prescription Opiate Litigation will have
significant implications on the legal battle against the opioid crisis. Not
only has the Cherokee Nation been deprived of the opportunity to sue
McKesson, and likely the other opioid defendants, in either tribal or state
court, now other tribes will be wary of bringing actions in their own courts.
While this case does not specifically implicate tribal jurisdiction, it is surely
part of a trend working against tribal sovereignty. A tribe’s right to sue its
own courts, under its own laws, is a key component of its status as a
sovereign nation. Without a robust foundation of federal case law that
supports that sovereignty, federal Indian law will continue to serve as a
detriment to tribal sovereignty. Part IV will discuss how the major cases in
231. Id. at 1078. “The government contractor defense applies when: ‘(a) the United
States approved reasonably precise specifications; (b) the equipment conformed to those
specifications; and (c) the supplier warned the United States about dangers in the use of the
equipment known to the supplier but not to the United States.’” Id. (quoting Boyle v. United
Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 501 (1988)).
232. Id. at 1069.
233. 28 U.S.C. 1442 (2018).
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federal Indian law have led to the situation today where federal courts do
not respect the importance of tribal sovereignty.
IV. Applying the History of Tribal Jurisdiction
to the Opioid Crisis Litigation
The analysis below will illustrate how the long history of the tribalfederal relationship, beginning with the Marshall Trilogy cases and ending
with the most recent policy decision by the current administration, has led
to this crisis point.
A. The Marshall Trilogy Cases
The “discovery doctrine” existed for hundreds of years before the
Supreme Court made its first interpretation in Johnson v. M’Intosh.234 In
this case, however, the Court held the European nation that “discovered”
the land held the only legitimate title. 235 The Court reasoned that it was
prudent to distinguish the sovereignty of tribes from that of an independent
nation with full property rights, limiting their land rights to that of
occupancy.236 The decision was the first blow to tribal sovereignty, putting
the authority of the tribes as secondary to that of the federal government.
While M’Intosh is no longer an oft cited case in Indian law, its impact on
the jurisdictional issues faced by the Cherokee Nation’s opioid litigation
should not be overlooked. M’Intosh set in motion the legal and moral
justifications behind the conquest of the American continent and the
genocide of its native people. 237
Following the M’Intosh decision, in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the
State of Georgia passed legislation destroying the governmental authority
of the Cherokee Nation and bringing its people and lands under control of
the state government.238 The Cherokee Nation filed suit to enjoin the
legislation in federal court.239 Marshall, writing for the Court, declined
jurisdiction over the case. “He determined that the tribes were ‘domestic
dependent nations’ and characterized the tribes relationship to the United
States as resembling ‘that of a ward to his guardian.’”240 Marshall was in
234. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
235. Id. at 562; see also Casey, supra note 112, at 409.
236. See Casey, supra note 112, at 409–10.
237. Kristen A. Carpenter & Eli Wald, Lawyering for Groups: The Case of American
Indian Tribal Attorneys, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3085, 3099 (2013).
238. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
239. Id. at 15.
240. Casey, supra note 112, at 410 (quoting Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17, 18).
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effect establishing the government’s view that tribes were not independent
nations for purposes of original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court. This
decision would become the justification needed for Congress to exert
plenary power over Indian tribes. 241 It also confirmed the inevitability set in
motion by M’Intosh: the idea that tribal authority is not only secondary to,
but is in fact, under direct control of the federal government.
While M’Intosh and Cherokee Nation made it clear that tribes were not
on the same plane as a foreign nation, Worcester v. Georgia established that
tribes could withstand the intrusion of state governments into their internal
affairs. Marshall, again writing for the Court, found that tribes and
individual states enjoy political independence from one another: “The
Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying its own territory,
with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can
have no force . . . .”242 The result of Worcester v. Georgia, if taken on its
own, put tribes on the same level as states within the dual sovereignty
system. In Both McKesson v. Hembree and In re National Opiate
Litigation, the Cherokee Nation argued that this status should give them the
right to assert jurisdiction over the opioid defendants in tribal court. No
federal court that reviewed the litigation acknowledged these arguments.
The remaining discussion below will further explain how, despite
Worcester v. Georgia, federal policy and court decisions have diminished
tribal sovereignty.
B. Federal Indian Law and the Politically Motivated Jig
The Marshall Trilogy cases set the stage on which political actors stand
as they dance the dance of federal Indian policy. This dance is not one that
has been rehearsed or even choreographed. Instead, policymakers can move
as the winds of politics shift around them. Under Worcester, tribal nations
began to establish political footing, but as white settlement pushed toward
the Mississippi River, President Andrew Jackson put pressure on Congress
to act in the interest of settlement. 243 Congress passed the Indian Removal
Act244 on May 28, 1830. The Act made legal the voluntary removal of the
tribes.245 Jackson hoped that by stipulating for the “negotiated” removal of
the tribes to the western territories, he could allow for continued settlement,
241. Id. at 410.
242. Id. at 561.
243. See Casey, supra note 112, at 411.
244. Act of May 28, 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 174
(2018)).
245. Id.; see also Casey, supra note 112, at 411.
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prevent further conflicts between the tribes and settlers, and maintain
separate status for the tribes. 246 Expansion continued west, and it soon
became clear that a new policy was needed to deal with the increasing
struggle between settlers and tribes.
Congress passed the Dawes Act in 1887,247 moving toward a policy of
assimilation. The Dawes Act dismantled tribal governments and
“transform[ed] the Indians into farmers, that being the quickest route to
assimilation.”248 The Dawes Act divided reservation land and allotted it to
individual members in trust for twenty-five years.249 The trust would then
convert to ownership in fee, with the land and its owner then under the
authority of federal and state laws. 250 The Act also allowed for any land
remaining after allotment to be sold to non-Indians. 251 “The end of the
allotment era saw approximately two thirds of Indian lands converted to
non-Indian ownership and very little progress toward the assimilation of
Indians . . . .”252 Although the assimilation of individual Indians could not
be achieved through allotment, it did trigger the destruction of the tribal
system of governance.
Having successfully dismantled the existing tribal system in order to
facilitate swifter settlement of the west, by 1934 the government was ready
to “remedy some of the damage [it] had caused.”253 The Indian
Reorganization Act (IRA)254 allowed tribes to reestablish a government
based on models provided by the federal government. 255 The effect of the
IRA was that tribes could establish some semblance of self-governance, just
without the full sovereignty that they enjoyed prior to the Dawes Act.
Federal Indian policy shifted again in the mid-1950s, when House
Concurrent Resolution 108 was passed in 1953, 256 instituting what is now
known as the termination era. In the name of “Indian emancipation,” 109
tribes and bands were dismantled, turning over control to the states where
246. See Casey, supra note 112, at 412.
247. Indian General Allotment Act of 1887 (Dawes Act), ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified
as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 336, 339, 341-342, 348-349, 381 (2018)).
248. Casey, supra note 112, at 412.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 413.
253. Id.
254. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5129 (2018)).
255. Casey, supra note 112, at 413.
256. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83rd Cong., 67 Stat. B132 (1953).
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they were located (California, Florida, New York, and Texas). 257 Another
shift occurred in the 1970s when President Nixon redirected federal Indian
policy towards self-determination.258 That policy preference carried through
the Obama administration. President Obama instituted a policy of
administrative interaction that described tribes as “sovereign nations” and
considered the relationships between tribal governments and the United
States as “government-to-government.”259
President Trump has not been as friendly to tribes as his predecessor. On
September 7, 2018, Department of the Interior (DOI) Assistant Secretary
Tara Sweeney “pave[d] the way for a reservation to be taken out of trust for
the first time since the termination era.”260
This series of schizophrenic policy shifts and legislation has caused great
harm to Native American people and crippled many tribes’ abilities to
support a functioning government. The federal government only recognized
tribal sovereignty until it became a hindrance to western settlement, at
which point the government destroyed the systems that tribes had
developed over many centuries. Once settlers had stretched to the far
western ranges of the United States and Indians were no longer a threat, the
federal government attempted to bring the tribes back through the IRA, but
not to the way they existed prior to settlement. Under the IRA, the federal
government pressured newly recognized tribes to organize themselves like
the federal government, but by this time their sovereignty had been ground
into dust.261
In this way, the government exerted control over the tribes by breaking
them down and then building them back up in its own image. As tribes
began to rebuild, America emerged victorious from World War II, and a
new era of American Exceptionalism was born. 262 Tribal self-determination
soon became antithetical to the “American way”; instead, Native Americans
would assimilate into the mainstream of society or risk being cast out as un257. Id.
258. Casey, supra note 112, at 414.
259. David M. Schraver & David H. Tennant, Indian Tribal Sovereignty-Current Issues,
75 ALB. L. REV. 133, 146 (2012) (citing Tribal Consultation, 74 Fed. Reg. 57881 (Nov. 5,
2009)).
260. Trump Administration Takes Indian Country Back to Termination Era,
INDIANZ.COM (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.indianz.com/News/2018/09/10/trumpadministration-takes-indian-countr.asp; see also Letter from Tara Sweeney, Assistant Sec’y,
Indian Affairs, Dep’t of Interior, to Cedric Cromwell, Chairman, Mashpee Wampanoag
Tribe (Sept. 7, 2018).
261. See Casey, supra note 112, at 413.
262. See O’Brien, supra note 136, at 1466.
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American.263 Termination was unsuccessful in achieving its stated goal to
“civilize and assimilate”264 Native Americans, but it was successful at yet
again damaging tribal governments and the social safety net established
during the previous era.265 Each cycle of dismantling and reconstructing
takes power away from tribal governments.
The damage to tribal sovereignty has been done, and the results are borne
in both in the opioid crisis, and in the Cherokee Nation’s opioid litigation.
Tribal members are far more likely to become addicted to substances like
prescription opioids and illicitly-manufactured fentanyl because of the harm
caused to the tribal way of life by the tumult of the federal-Indian
relationship. Similarly, tribal sovereignty has been greatly diminished from
the days of Worcester v. Georgia. Where tribes once stood on equal footing
with states in the dual sovereignty system, resulting in part to the evershifting landscape of federal Indian policy, tribes today are subject to court
decisions that threaten their ability to protect their own citizens. In filing its
action in tribal court, the Cherokee Nation sought to right not only the
wrongs done to its members by the opioid defendants, but perhaps also to
right the wrongs that have been done to Indians across this country for
hundreds of years. Until tribes can retain the status they once held alongside
states, decisions like McKesson and In re National Prescription Opioid
Litigation will continue to threaten the tribal way of life.
VI. Conclusion
The opioid crisis has wreaked havoc on tribal communities across the
country. The Cherokee Nation attempted to assert its sovereign authority to
protect its people, but it was denied that authority by the Northern District
of Oklahoma. Since the decision in McKesson, the Cherokee Nation joined
with the State of Oklahoma in a similar action in state court. Again, the
Tribe’s ability to sue in a venue of its choosing was thwarted by a federal
court. This time District Court for the Northern District of Ohio removed
the Tribe’s action in state court to federal court under the federal officer
removal statute. The decision resulted in the Tribe’s case again being
removed to federal court.
These two decisions have forced the Tribe to pursue its causes of action
exclusively in federal court. Looking back, there is a bit of sad irony
surrounding the ultimate results of these two cases. The court in McKesson
263. Id.
264. Casey, supra note 112, at 413.
265. O’Brien, supra note 136, at 1467–68.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019

388

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

v. Hembree relied in part on the idea that the Tribe would indeed have a
choice of venue after being denied jurisdiction in tribal court.266 However,
the Northern District of Ohio’s decision in In re National Prescription
Opioid Litigation proved that reliance to be unfounded. These decisions are
a retelling of an old story; the Tribe asserted its jurisdiction, but the federal
judiciary saw fit to deny that authority, instead asserting its own jurisdiction
over the claims in a “take it or leave it” fashion.
The relationship between the tribes and the U.S. government is littered
with decisions that have limited tribal sovereignty and prevented tribal
governments from realizing their full potential to govern tribal citizens.
These decisions and the end results are no different, and until the federal
judiciary recognizes the importance of tribal sovereignty, can expect that
old story to continue to their peril.

266. McKesson Corp. v. Hembree, No. 17-CV-323-TCK-FHM, 2018 WL 340042, at *11
(N.D. Okla. Jan. 9, 2018).
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